I. Introduction
The consequences of bank distress for the economy during the Depression remains an area of unresolved controversy. Since Fisher (1933) and Keynes (1931) , macroeconomists have argued that bank distress magnified the extent of the economic decline during the Depression. As the intermediaries controlling money and credit, banks were in a special position to transmit their distress to other sectors.
But the mechanism through which banking distress mattered for the economy has been hotly contested. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) saw the contraction in the money multiplier -driven in large part by panicked depositors' withdrawals of funds -as the primary mechanism through which banking distress affected the real economy. They described the mechanism transmitting banking distress to the real sector as operating at the national level through changes in the aggregate supply of money and interest rates.
Bank distress reduced the money supply available to the public either through the closure of banks and the consequent freezing of bank deposits, or the withdrawals of deposits by depositors that feared bank failure. Bernanke (1983) , building on Fisher (1933) , emphasized the transmission of monetary shocks via their effects on the balance sheets of borrowers and on the supply of credit by banks. Borrowers' balance sheets were worsened by "debt deflation" as the result of fixed dollar debt obligationsborrowers' net worth and cash flow declined with the rising value of debt service costs relative to income.
Borrowers with positive net present value projects, but weak balance sheets, had less internally generated retained earnings to invest and could not qualify for credit. Furthermore, the contraction of the money supply and the weakness of borrowers' balance sheets, Bernanke argued, weakened banks, and thus forced a reduction in the supply of bank loans. Many firms and individuals relied on banks for credit, and as those banks suffered losses of capital (due to loan write downs) and contractions in deposits (as depositors reacted to bank weakness by withdrawing their funds), even borrowers with viable projects and strong balance sheets experienced a decrease in the effective supply of loanable funds.
Bernanke termed the combined weakening of borrowers' balance sheets and the contraction in bank credit supply a rise in the "cost of credit intermediation." The scarcity of perfect substitutes for the positive net present value investments of firms with weak balance sheets, and for the credit supplied by existing banks, implies that the weakening of firms' and banks' balance sheets, the disappearance of banks, and the contraction in surviving banks' lending make it more difficult for the economy to channel funds to their best use. Thus, what began as a contraction in aggregate demand became a contraction in aggregate supply, magnifying adverse economic shocks, and prolonging and deepening the Depression.
The financial distress of firms and banks, and the decline in bank lending, were not only symptoms of the Depression, but means for magnifying the shocks that caused the Depression. Bernanke's statistical evidence in support of this story is derived from time series analysis at the national level, in particular his regression analysis relating bank failures, business failures, and deflation to subsequent output contraction, even after taking into account money contraction.
Some have challenged Bernanke's view, arguing that existing evidence does not necessarily indicate that borrower creditworthiness and bank credit supply were important channels for magnifying shocks.
1 Call the first critique the "loan-demand" critique. Proponents of this critique argue that an aggregate decline in bank credit, like that which occurred during the Depression, does not necessarily imply a decline in bank credit supply due to weak borrower or bank balance sheets. Instead, it may simply indicate a lack of viable projects for firms to pursue in a depressed economy. A decline in bank lending may reflect a contraction in loan demand in anticipation of, or simultaneous with, contractions in output. Thus, the fact that loan contraction accompanies or precedes output contraction does not necessarily imply a causal connection running from financial distress and loan supply to output. The loandemand critique was a point of view that found support during the 1930s (see Hardy and Viner 1935 and Kimmel 1939) .
To address the loan-demand critique one must identify sources of loan supply as distinct from loan demand. Calomiris and Wilson (1998) construct a model that identifies changes in bank loan supply and apply that model to New York City banks during the Depression. They find that loan supply did contract during the Depression in reaction to increased default risk. The implication of their findings is that at least part of the contraction in bank lending in New York during the Depression reflected loan supply contraction. Calomiris and Wilson (1998) , however, do not link loan-supply shocks to subsequent output shocks. Thus they do not demonstrate that loan-supply, rather than loan-demand, contractions were associated with lower future income growth. In our empirical work below we use the framework developed by Calomiris and Wilson to motivate our approach to identifying loan-supply shocks and linking them to subsequent income growth.
A second critique of Bernanke was developed by Rockoff (1993), which we will call the "qualityof-money" critique. Rockoff shows that Bernanke's evidence of the importance of bank and business failures for aggregate economic activity is not robust to the inclusion of other time series variables in the regression. Rockoff constructs a measure of the quality-adjusted money supply, which takes account of the fact that deposits in suspended banks were not perfect substitutes for non-suspended deposits as a form of money. He finds that including his measure of quality-adjusted money in the Bernanke empirical specification avoids any need for additional, non-monetary explanatory variables. Rockoff's point, more generally, is that any aggregate time series variable with large spikes during 1929-1933 will take explanatory power away from Bernanke's measures.
The goal of this paper is to consider tests of the Bernanke view that take into account the loandemand and quality-of-money critiques. Our starting point is the insight that disaggregation is a promising means of identification. Our strategy is to devise empirical tests using disaggregated data (at the state level) that can distinguish between Bernanke's interpretation of his findings and the interpretations offered by critics.
transmission mechanism of shocks during the Great Depression in which the properly-adjusted aggregate money supply displaces the aggregate supply of bank loans as an explanatory variable. An important difference between the two alternative explanations, however, is that in theory loan supply should matter for income locally as well as in the aggregate, while money supply should only matter in the aggregate.
Because there is a national market for money (in which reserves and cash are traded), there is no statelevel variation in the supply of money. Under the U.S. unit banking system and dual chartering (of state and national banks), in contrast, the supply of bank credit is local; banks from other parts of the country (which lack the information local banks have about customers) cannot provide perfect substitutes for local bank credit. In short, disaggregation by state within the United States offers a promising approach for assessing the importance of the Bernanke view because of the locational isolation that was peculiar to American banking.
2
This difference between the national money market and the local credit market implies that crosssectional variation (across states) in the observed stock of money, per se, is entirely endogenous to local money demand, but cross-sectional variation in loans reflects a combination of local loan supply and loan demand. We show that, consistent with the Bernanke interpretation, cross-state variation in loan growth is positively associated with cross-state variation in income growth during the Depression, a fact that cannot reflect the influence of money-supply disturbances.
Of course, one could argue that this cross-sectional variation reflects loan-demand effects (changes in loan demand that reflect the state of the economy rather than the financial health of borrowers or banks). To take account of the loan-demand critique we have to make additional identifying assumptions. We focus on deposits (the source of funds for loans) as our indicator of available funds for lending; Calomiris and Wilson (1998) and Mason (1997, 2000) show that depositor preferences for liquidity and perceptions of bank risk caused variations in bank deposits, which would have been a primary source of variation in the supply of credit banks could offer. It seems plausible to assume that loan-demand shocks have greater relative impact on the loan-to-asset ratio, which loan-supply shocks have greater relative impact on deposit growth (although, obviously, both deposits and the loan-to-asset ratio would reflect influences from both loan supply and loan demand). Thus, focusing on deposits (as opposed to loans) is likely to be a more promising first step for identifying loan-supply effects. We consider various means for identifying loan-supply shocks, as reflected in deposit growth at the state level. We find that variation in loan supply explains a substantial amount of the variation in income growth.
Having found evidence that loan-supply variation was an important source of income change during the Great Depression, we investigate the mechanism through which loan supply affected income.
One possibility is that bank loan supply mattered for income through "orderly shifts" in the supply of loanable funds. An alternative possibility (which we term the "crisis" channel) is that bank failures mattered per se; that is, that the immediate short-term disruptions in local markets caused by bank failures produced spikes of commercial distress and disruptions of business activity. We test for the importance of the "crisis" channel by relating high-frequency (quarterly) banking distress at the state level to highfrequency state-level commercial distress (liabilities of failed non-financial businesses). We find no evidence in support of the "crisis" channel. We conclude that loan-supply effects operated primarily through "orderly" low-frequency shifts in the supply of credit, rather than through high-frequency financial collapses of borrowers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the data set.
Section 3 investigates the linkages at the state level between bank distress and economic activity. We examine links between cross-sectional differences in loan supply (measured various ways) and income at the state level over the period [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] , and also explore the link between loan supply and income in the context of a panel VAR model of annual loan growth and income growth for the period 1929 -1932 to examine high-frequency links (the "crisis" channel) we employ a panel VAR model relating banking distress and commercial distress. Section 4 summarizes our results and concludes.
Data
Our data set contains a wide variety of variables that differ by frequency, geographic scope, and level of disaggregation. In this section we describe briefly the definitions and sources for our data, and explain the limits of our sample.
With the help and support of the St. Louis Fed and the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, and subsequently, with funding from the National Science Foundation, we assembled bank-level balance sheet and income statement data from microfilm records of "call reports" of all Federal Reserve member banks (see Mason 1998 for an overview of the call report data we collected). We designed our data collection effort (1) to track the experience of individual banks over time, (2) to relate their failure or balance sheet changes to a detailed set of prior, individual bank characteristics and the existing local economic environment in which the banks operated, and (3) to permit an analysis of the effects of banking distress on the local economic environment. Thus, in addition to call report data we also collected data on the timing of bank failures, changes in the names of banks over time, and a wide variety of county-level, state-level, and nationwide measures of economic environment.
Our data can be usefully grouped into four categories of data fields, which differ according to their degree of disaggregation: bank-level, county-level, state-level, and nation-level data. Table 1 provides a list of the variables used and their definitions.
A. Bank-Specific Data and Bank Failure Risk
Bank-specific data include balance sheet and income statement information for virtually all Fed member banks. Individual bank data (aggregated at the state level) are used in our empirical work to identify the condition of banks in our effort to identify loan-supply shocks.
Our sample of member banks comprises a large segment of the banking sector, and is likely to provide a reliable picture of the experience of banks during the Great Depression, although the exclusion of non-member banks substantially reduces the measured bank failure rate (see Calomiris and Mason 2000) . Our data on bank balance sheets and income statements are limited to observations from the December 1929 call report. Balance sheet data record asset and liability positions on that date, and income statements record categories of income for the previous six months. These records are quite detailed, and allow us to observe categories of assets, liabilities, expenses, and other variables at a fine level of disaggregation. The call report also contains information on the number of branches operated by each bank.
B. County-Level Data
Information about the economic attributes of particular counties is available from Census data for 1930. These data include demographic information, data on different categories of economic activity, unemployment, investment, and a wide variety of other variables. County-level economic circumstances pertaining to agriculture contain substantial explanatory power for bank distress in our analysis. Our measures include data on agricultural investment in land, buildings and equipment, the size distribution of farms, and the proportion of agricultural value added in the various categories of agricultural production (proxied by the proportion of value added in a category, or by the amount of land devoted to a category).
County-level data on all banks' deposits and loans, and on the deposits of suspended banks are available on an annual basis from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. These data provide an alternative to individual bank data on failure risk as a measure of bank condition at the state level. Bankers Directory, and data on the size of non-member bank suspensions from annual Federal Reserve data on the deposits of suspended non-member banks.
Our annual analysis of loan-supply effects uses of annual state-level data on production income from Slaughter (1937).
D. National-Level Data
As part of our measurement of bank failure risk at the individual bank level (discussed in more detail in Calomiris and Mason 2000) we use national level data on bond yields to capture variation in capital gains and losses banks experienced from their holdings of bonds. We use a monthly series on government bond yields, constructed by the Federal Reserve Board (1976, pp. 429, 468) . We also collected data on monthly changes in an agricultural price index, defined as the log difference of a monthly index of all agricultural products based on 30 items, from The Farm Real Estate Situation.
Identifying Loan-Supply Effects
We now turn to our empirical analysis of the loan-supply channel. We examine the consequences of bank condition for the supply of loans, and the effect of loan-supply shifts on the non-financial sector of the economy. Here we distinguish two possible channels linking bank condition to economic activity through the lending channel: business distress that results immediately from the failure of banks (a sudden, high-frequency channel that we call the "crisis" channel), and the more continuous process of reduced business activity due to a long-term contraction of the supply of loans by banks.
Bank distress contributes to both problems; bank failures destroy the "information capital" of failed institutions, and make it more costly for bank borrowers to access credit markets. Surviving banks are unlikely to be perfect substitutes for failing banks as suppliers of credit to the customers of failed banks. Additionally, if surviving banks have themselves suffered losses of capital and increases in asset risk, they will come under pressure from depositors (via the threat of withdrawal) to reduce their asset risk, which is often accomplished by curtailing the supply of loans. Calomiris and Wilson (1998) 
A. Identifying Lending Channel Effects on Income: A Cross-Sectional Analysis
The challenge to identifying the loan-supply effect is finding a means of separating the influences of money from bank credit, and also separating supply-side and demand-side associations between bank lending and economic activity. A first step to separating the lending channel from the monetary channel is to posit that lending channel influences are local, while monetary policy influences (variation in the national supply of money, or the riskless interest rate) operate on integrated national money markets. analysis, we confine the time period for measuring our explanatory variables to the period prior to 1933.
As Table 2 shows, deposit and loan growth during 1931 and 1932 are associated with income growth, even after controlling for lagged income growth (during 1930) and for contemporaneous building activity and business failures (which also have significant partial correlations with state-level income growth).
Of course, Table 2 .We use our instruments to predict bank failure risk and deposit contraction, and interpret these predicted outcomes as loan-supply shocks. In our analysis of loan-supply effects (identified by the effects of bank condition on bank survival and deposit growth) we also include various controls for demand-side influences.
Specifically, using various measures of bank condition and local economic environment (measured in 1929 and 1930) , in Table 3 we derive predicted values for deposit growth for the period spanning 1931
and 1932, and deposits in suspended banks at the county level for the year 1930. We aggregate each of these two measures to the state level.
In Table 4 , we include our forecasts of state-level deposit growth in cross-sectional regressions of state income growth for the period 1930-1932. Our identifying assumption in Table 4 is that measures of bank condition that predict preexisting bank distress in 1930 are correlated with loan-supply shifts for the period 1931-1932 and not with loan-demand shifts during that period. We find that instrumented deposit growth (our measure of the loan-supply effect) has significant explanatory power for cross-sectional variation in state income in [1930] [1931] [1932] . In some specifications we include controls for income growth in 1930 and add contemporaneous measures of building activity and commercial distress at the state level, as well. And in the final column of Table 4 we also include additional measures of the local economic environment (unemployment, and various agricultural indicators measured in 1930) which were also included in our predicting regressions in Table 3 . We include these controls in the last column of Table 4 because these predictors of deposit growth arguably could be correlated with loan demand in the period 1930-1932. Our results are robust to including these controls. Table 5 pursues a complementary approach to identifying loan-supply shifts at the state level. In Table 5 , we use actual bank distress and Arellano and Bover (1995) .
Granger causality tests for the panel VAR are reported in Table 6 . We find that loan growth predicts income growth, and vice versa. Furthermore, at the two-year forecast horizon, shocks to loan growth explain a significant proportion of future income growth. Of course, given the small number of observations and limited lag structure of the model, impulse responses and forecast variances are not of much interest. That is especially true given the fact that shocks to the two variables are negatively correlated, making the origins of shocks hard to interpret (since loan-supply and loan-demand shocks both suggest positive contemporaneous correlation between innovations in loans and income).
Nevertheless, under the assumption that loan-supply shocks tended to precede income shocks during the Depression -an assumption that is consistent with the observed timing of banking distress and business cycle turning points during the Depression (see Calomiris and Mason 2000) -the Granger causality results linking loans to future income growth are consistent with the conclusions of the previous section that the association between state-level variation in loan and income growth during the Great Depression reflects in large part loan-supply disturbances that originate in the banking system, as well as endogenous responses of loans to demand-side shocks.
C. State-Level Quarterly Panel VAR Analysis of Bank Distress and Commercial Distress
Here we turn to the question of whether high-frequency "crisis" links between bank distress and commercial distress explain the linkages between credit supply and income shown above. We construct a quarterly state-level model that examines the high-frequency two-way links over time between bank distress and commercial distress. Commercial distress affects banking distress through the effect of commercial distress on the value of bank loan portfolios. Banking failures can lead to the contraction of the supply of credit, which could transmit the distress of banks to bank borrowers.
We use a panel data VAR model that assumes aggregate macro (time) effects (which includes deterministic seasonal effects) and state-level fixed effects. As before, time effects are removed by timedifferencing and fixed effects are removed by Helmert transformation.
Our two-variable VAR system models the relationship between commercial failure and bank failure, where both are defined as log ratios of the liabilities of failed businesses or banks within a particular state in a particular quarter relative to that state's annual income in 1929. Log ratios are chosen to avoid problems of heteroskedasticity. We also experimented with three-variable panel VAR systems, including the value of building permits as an additional quarterly variable. Including building permits did not change the relationship between commercial and bank failures and, surprisingly (in light of our earlier results) never indicated a significant and important relationship between either of the failures variables and building permits. Therefore, we do not report those results here.
We experimented with two-quarter, three-quarter, and four-quarter lag structures for our VAR model, and found significant explanatory power from including longer lags. Table 7 reports the coefficients for the commercial failures and bank failures regressions, including four quarterly lags of each of the dependent variables in the specification. The correlation between the residuals in the two predicting equations is 0.17. This correlation is rather low, indicating little in the way of strong contemporaneous quarterly association between commercial failure and bank failure. Our impulse responses and forecast variance decompositions, consequently, did not depend much on the order of orthogonalization chosen between commercial and bank failures.
We report results for the orthogonalization that places commercial failures first. Doing so does not qualitatively change any of the results we report. For example, the percent of the variance of commercial failures that is explained by bank failure shocks (at both the ten-and twenty-quarter horizon)
rises from 2 percent to 4 percent when bank failure shocks are placed first in the orthogonalization, and the percent of the variance of bank failures explained by commercial failure shocks declines from 25 percent to 22 percent.
The impulse-response functions and variance decompositions are implemented as described in Hamilton (1994) . They are reported in Table 8 , and impulse responses and standard errors are plotted in Figure 1 . The standard errors on impulse-response functions are calculated using Monte-Carlo simulation with 500 repetitions.
Commercial failures exert an important and statistically significant effect on bank failures, but not vice versa. The largest predictive effect occurs at the third quarter lag, and the impulse response relating commercial failure shocks to bank failures peaks at the fourth quarter, and persists beyond the sixth quarter.
We conclude from these results that (1) there is little contemporaneous high-frequency association between commercial and bank distress at the state level, (2) there is a substantial unidirectional link between commercial distress and bank distress, and (3) most of that relationship becomes important only after several months of delay.
Conclusion
We examine the effects of bank condition on loan supply, and through loan supply, on real economic activity. We investigate whether banking distress was an important propagator of shocks that originated elsewhere in the economy, through a loan-supply channel. Wicker, Elmus (1996) . The Banking Panics of the Great Depression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Table 1 Variable 1930-1933 1930-1933 1930-1932 1930-1932 1930-1932 1930-1932 1930-1932 1930-1932 1930-1932 1930-1932 1930-1932 Definitions: Quarterly failures of banks (lbl) and commercial enterprises (lcl) in the panel VAR are defined as the log ratios, respectively, of the liabilities of failed businesses or banks in a given quarter, relative to the state's annual income in 1929. Quarterly data are used for the period 1929 through 1932. The panel VAR model places commercial failures first in the orthogonalization of shocks in the system. Reversing the order has little effect on the results, as described in the text.
